On May 22, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a trademark opposition filed by a consumer, holding that mere consumer interest does not confer standing under Section 13 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1063). In Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 23-2140 (Fed. Cir. May 22, 2025), the court reinforced the application of the Supreme Court’s Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), standing framework to administrative trademark proceedings. The decision confirms that only parties with a commercial interest fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the statute when challenging a mark.
Background
United Trademark Holdings (UTH) applied to register the trademark RAPUNZEL for use on dolls and toy figures. Rebecca Curtin, a law professor, doll collector, and parent, opposed the registration. She argued that “Rapunzel” is a generic or descriptive term and that registering the mark would harm consumers by “reducing competition and increasing prices” in the market for fairytale-themed dolls.
TTAB Proceedings and Standing Analysis
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissed Curtin’s opposition for lack of statutory standing. Applying the Lexmark framework, the Board held that Curtin failed to establish that her interests fell within the Lanham Act’s “zone of interests” or that she had suffered a proximate injury. As a consumer, her opposition did not satisfy either prong of the Lexmark test. Curtin appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
The Appeal: Curtin v. UTH
On appeal, Curtin argued that she had standing under Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999), a case involving an opposition to marks alleged to be “immoral” or “scandalous.” She asserted that Ritchie recognized broader standing for consumers under Section 13 of the Lanham Act.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Lexmark, not Ritchie, governs the standing inquiry. The Court emphasized that Lexmark articulated the proper framework for assessing statutory entitlement to bring a cause of action under the Lanham Act and applies equally to administrative proceedings before the TTAB.
Because Curtin challenged the RAPUNZEL mark on grounds of genericness and descriptiveness—claims typically raised by market competitors—the Court held that her interest as a consumer did not fall within the relevant zone of interests.
Speculative Harm Insufficient to Establish Proximate Cause
The Court also rejected Curtin’s asserted injuries—namely, increased prices, reduced competition, and limited access to diverse interpretations of the Rapunzel character—as too attenuated. These harms were described as “too speculative and derivative of harm that might be suffered by commercial competitors.”
Curtin’s submission of a petition signed by more than 400 like-minded consumers did not alter the Court’s conclusion that her alleged harms were insufficient to establish proximate cause.
Practice Implications
This decision serves as a clear reaffirmation that only parties with a direct commercial interest—such as competitors, potential entrants, or entities with a tangible economic stake—have standing to oppose trademark registrations based on claims of genericness, descriptiveness, or similar grounds.
For practitioners, Curtin v. UTH highlights that:
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Consumer status alone is insufficient to establish statutory standing under § 1063.
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The Lexmark framework governs standing in TTAB proceedings, even where prior Federal Circuit decisions (like Ritchie) might have suggested broader access.
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Speculative or derivative injuries do not satisfy the requirement of proximate cause under Lexmark.
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The TTAB and courts will continue to scrutinize oppositions from parties without a concrete commercial interest in the challenged mark.
Final Thought
While Curtin’s challenge may have reflected broader public concern about privatizing cultural icons, the Federal Circuit’s decision underscores that trademark opposition proceedings are reserved for those with a commercial stake—not for consumers acting in the public interest. Our IP attorneys see the court’s decision made clear, there was no fairytale ending here for consumer-based opposition.