In a landmark decision handed down in mid-March, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed that works created solely by artificial intelligence (AI) are ineligible for copyright protection. The case, Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 23-5233 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2025), reinforces the U.S. Copyright Office’s long-standing position that copyright protection is reserved for works authored by human beings. This ruling aligns closely with the Copyright Office’s recent publication, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability (2025), which addresses the evolving intersection of AI and copyright law.
While the outcome may appear straightforward, the case leaves unresolved important questions about the degree of human involvement necessary for AI-assisted works to qualify for copyright protection. Future litigation or a possible appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court could further develop this area of law.Key Takeaways:
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The Copyright Act of 1976 requires that all copyrightable works be authored by a human.
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The statute does not recognize machines as “authors.”
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The work-made-for-hire doctrine presupposes an existing copyright interest and cannot be used to bootstrap authorship onto AI.
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Dr. Thaler’s admission that the work was “autonomously” created by a machine undermined his legal challenges.
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The court rejected arguments that (1) the term “author” includes non-human creators, (2) AI-generated works fall under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, and (3) the human-authorship requirement unjustly excludes AI-generated content.
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Registration was denied because the named “author” was a machine.Background
Dr. Stephen Thaler, a computer scientist and AI developer, created a generative system known as the Creativity Machine, which produced an image titled A Recent Entrance to Paradise. In his copyright application, Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine as the sole author, while asserting ownership of the work himself. The U.S. Copyright Office rejected the registration, citing its human-authorship requirement.
Dr. Thaler responded by filing suit against the Copyright Office and its Director, Shira Perlmutter, arguing that the human-authorship standard was both unconstitutional and unsupported by statutory or case law. After the district court upheld the Copyright Office’s decision, Thaler appealed to the D.C. Circuit.Court’s Analysis
The appellate court strongly affirmed the district court’s reasoning and the Copyright Office’s policy, holding that copyright law requires a human author.
Dr. Thaler first argued that the term “author” under the Copyright Act does not explicitly require humanness. While acknowledging that the Act lacks a specific definition of “author,” the Court analyzed a broad range of statutory provisions—17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a), 104(a), 108(c)(2), 109(b)(1)(B)(i), 117(d)(1), 201(a), 203(a)(2), 204(a), 302, and 401(a)—and concluded that “the reading of the Act suggests that an author must be a human, not a machine.”
The Court highlighted several key points:
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Authors must be capable of owning property;
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Copyright duration is based on the author’s life;
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Rights of inheritance presume human relationships (e.g., spouses, children);
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Transfers of ownership require valid signatures;
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Nationality and domicile are relevant to rights;
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Intention to create is a foundational element of authorship.
Because machines do not possess these human attributes, they cannot satisfy the requirements to be legal authors under the Act. As the Court noted, “machines cannot own property, do not have a lifespan that is measured in the same time as that of a human, lack surviving spouses or heirs, cannot provide authenticating signatures, and do not possess a domicile or national identity.”
Next, Dr. Thaler claimed that the work-qualified under the work-made-for-hire doctrine. The Court rejected this, explaining that AI cannot qualify as an “employee” under the law, and cannot assign rights it never possessed. The opinion emphasized that “if Congress intended an ‘author’ to include non-human entities, it would have explicitly stated that those who hire creators are the ‘authors,’ rather than saying they are ‘considered the author for purposes of this title.’”
Finally, Thaler argued that excluding machine-generated works would hinder innovation and stifle creativity. But the Court found this concern speculative and unconvincing: “Machines do not respond to economic incentives,” and the policy implications of extending copyright to AI are for Congress—not the courts—to consider.Looking Ahead
While Thaler’s claims were ultimately unsuccessful, the Court’s opinion left the door open for future cases addressing human involvement in AI-assisted works. Notably, Thaler did not pursue the argument that he, as the human developer and operator of the Creativity Machine, was the true author. This omission leaves open the unresolved legal question of how much human creativity or input is required for AI-assisted works to qualify for protection.
As artificial intelligence continues to shape the creative and business landscapes, this decision underscores a critical legal boundary. For businesses and individuals leveraging AI tools to generate creative works—from images to music, software, or text—it is essential to ensure meaningful human involvement in the conception or execution of the work if copyright protection is sought.
Conclusion
The D.C. Circuit’s decision affirms a clear principle: copyright protection in the United States is available only to human authors. As courts, policymakers, and creators navigate the growing influence of AI, legal clarity on what constitutes sufficient human authorship will become increasingly important. For now, companies using AI in their creative processes should carefully evaluate the role of human contributors—not only to secure legal protections but to strategically position their innovations within the boundaries of current copyright law.